Institute for Research in Cognitive Science University of Pennsylvania 401C seminar room 3401 Walnut St., suite 400C May 19, 1992 Talk No. 1: Channels 1:00 pm A central debate in cognitive science and modern philosophy is whether or not it is possible to give a naturalistic account of intentionality. How can we understand this ability of people and other cognitive agents as part of the natural order, populating a physical world governed by natural law? Or must we understand the physical world as a mental, linguistic, or social construct? In this talk I want to propose a mathematical model for the notion of a law-like regularity, which I will call a {\em channel}, into two parts: a relationship between particular events (called a {\em signaling relation}) and a relationship between types of events (called an {\it indicating relation}). The latter is a {\em regularity} by virtue of reflecting properties of the former. The two-level analysis allows us to explain how regularities can be reliable but also admit of exceptions, and allows us to unify a great many apprarently divergent approaches to information and knowledge within a single framework. The talk will be informal with the mathematics kept to a minimum. Only at the very end will I point in the direction of connections with the work of Freyd and Scedrov on the notion of an allegory. Part of this work is joint with Jerry Seligman. May 20, 1992 Talk No. 2: Logic and Diagrams 1:00 pm When one looks at logic in practice, whether it be in science, engineering, or everyday life, the extent to which various forms of diagrammatic representation are used in design, reasoning, and problem solving is more than striking; it is staggering. Think about the diagrams used in physics, chemistry, biology, hardware design, and architecture, let alone geometry and topology. But diagrams have been largely ignored by logicians. Aside from a few obvious counter-examples (Euler, Venn, Frege, Peirce, e.g.), most logicians have closed their eyes, and those of their students, to the diagrammatic aspects of reasoning. In this talk I will suggest that logicians should study valid reasoning in systems of representation that make use of such graphical devices as first-class representations, and that they should teach principles of diagrammatic reasoning to their students. I will go on to discuss some steps that have been undertaken in that direction. This talk is based on joint work with John Etchemendy and a number of other people who will be identified and blamed during the talk. May 21, '92 Talk No.3: After the Revolution: Information and Academia 1pm The function and structure of the research university (RU), as we have come to know and love it, is based on certain assumptions. I want to examine some of these assumptions, suggesting that they are being called into serious question by the information revolution. If my analysis is correct, the RU is in jeopardy and could go the way of the the dinosaur, the ship-building industry in the 19th century, and the Soviet Union. I then want to propose some short-term measures which should be taken to help RUs adapt, rather than succumb, to the revolution. This is not an area in which I am an expert, but it is one where I have had many painful experiences, ones which give rise to the reflections in the talk. ==================================================================