EXTENSIONAL REALIZABILITY REFUTES SCOTT'S AXIOM It is well known that in the category of w-Sets there are several full small internally complete subcategories : - PER : interprets propositions - complete extensional pers , Sigma replete pers : candidates for effective domains ! Now the idea might be to use PER as propositions to speak about effective domains. Of course, this is possible ! BUT the logic is quite weak in the sense that the Proposition expressing Scott's Axiom is not realized !! PROOF : Let SIG denote the per corresponding to the r.e. subobject classifier . If Scott's Axiom (see e.g. M. Hyland in the Como Proc. or P. Taylor in the LICS'91 Proc. !) were realizable then there would exist a realizable morphism M : ((N -> SIG) -> SIG) -> N* ( N is the predomain of natural numbers and N* is N with bottom) such that for all F in (N -> SIG) -> SIG) : (a) M(F) = )bot) iff F()lambda ) x . )top)) = )bot) and (b) M(F) = n implies F()lambda) x < n . )top)) = )top) . As M is realizable it is monotonic we have that for all F in (N -> SIG) -> SIG) : M(F) less_or_equal M()lambda ) f . )top)) . Thus M applied to the least element gives )bot) and there exists a natural number n such that for all other F M(F) = n . But that would mean that for all F which are not least it holds that f(k) = )top) for all k < n implies F(f) = )top) . BUT THIS IS A CONTRADICTION : consider F := )lambda) f . f(n) ; this F is nontrivial and F()lambda) x < n . )top)) = )bot) . Thus such an M (Modulus of Continuity) cannot exist . END OF PROOF Of course, this proof can be performed for any reasonable axiomatization of SDT in an extensional type theory : If N is a proposition we can prove that all elements of N are equal ! Thus all propositions contain at most one element ! Thus we are again back at the effective tripos over w-Set , i.e. in some sense the topos-theoretic approach to SDT is the best we can expect. Actually to my opinion we do not need the full topos logic it is sufficient to consider triposes. I think the axiom of comprehension : A type , P predicate on A --------------------------------- { x : A | P(x) } type is not very nice to work with syntactically. At least I do not know a nice treatment by proof rules. By the way it is not a real restriction : from any tripos we can construct the associated topos. Thomas Streicher ======================================
Actually to my opinion we do not need the full topos logic it is sufficient to consider triposes. I think the axiom of comprehension : A type , P predicate on A --------------------------------- { x : A | P(x) } type is not very nice to work with syntactically. I appreciate Thomas Streicher's interesting observation about PERs but I don't see how does it lead him to this opinion about the comprehension. Comprehension is not a special property of PERs, nor are PERs its special model. Comprehension doesn't seem to play any role here. PERs are used as propositions/truth values when one uses them to model something like the Theory of Constructions. (Comprehension comes in, I suppose, only in a paper where I showed that Constructions can be given a familiar "set-theoretical" appearance, Springer LNCS #530.) I do not understand the point of comparing whether it is better to use Constructions (with or without comprehension) or the internal language of a topos. These things are at different levels. (Tripos is clearly weaker. For some purposes, however, I am sure that even first order logic will do.) Regards to all, Dusko Pavlovic P.S. Concerning the proof-theoretical difficulties with comprehension (if this is meant by "not very nice to work with") I can only say that these difficulties can not be a sufficient reason to dismiss a logical operation. Comprehension is certainly less difficult than the sum or the existential quantifier. ======================================
Here are some remarks on Duskos reaction on my comments about comprehension. What I meant was the following : comprehension is a means for TRANSFORMING PROPOSITIONS (i.e. objects in the fibre of some hyperdoctrine) to DATATYPES (i.e. objects in the base) in other words it allows to CONSIDER collections of proofs as types of objects. That is what I would call a mixing of levels of language : "data" are "real objects" WHEREAS "proofs" are "meta objects" . So one might be able to define functions which depend on proof objects but deliver say natural numbers. If I remember correctly exactly this is what Dusko wants to avoid by his theory of predicates. Thomas Streicher P.S. I - of course - do not mean that comprehension is "inconsistent" BUT I mean that it changes the notion of algorithm considerably and in an unintuitive way.
participants (2)
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pavlovic@triples.Math.McGill.CA -
Thomas Streicher